On Capital Punishment
July 20th, 2006 by Stephen
At first sight this may seem like a no-brainer: that killing for vengeance is nowhere near as immoral as killing for some other reason.
However, after a particularly nasty murder in the UK, I noticed one person, Blewyn, wrote to say that to kill the murderer would make us as bad as the original murderer.
Now I take it that Blewyn is alluding to some deeper understanding of human motive and the human condition, which we really ought to try and understand before firing off the first ad hominem that comes to mind.
Why should we consider the issue? Well it is clear to me that Blewyn is an intelligent person, who thinks differently from others on this issue. By granting that he is clearly intelligent, we must suppose there is intelligent reason for his comparison above, and until we understand that reasoning, we cannot hope to accept or refute it.
That alone is an important principle of critical thinking that would do so much to promote understanding in our society.
Now for this discussion, I intend to use a hypothetical example so as not to distress anyone familiar with real cases who may happen to find this message.
So let us suppose that someone, Cornelius, murders another person - Aurelia. Let us suppose that Aurelia is an accomplished archer, and that Cornelius hates archers.
Now to get inside the head of Cornelius is difficult, and not wholly desireable, but let us suppose that his hatred for archers has consumed him to some extent. It stems perhaps from a childhood event where his father stood him by a tree and shot an apple from above his head; but over the years his nightmares of that event turned to hatred, and his hatred was repressed until eventually he came to the point where he could not look at an archer without feeling a mix of hatred and a longing for his father (who left him alone shortly after the apple event).
Thus whenever Cornelius sees Aurelia he is consumed by normally repressed emotions, and on one occasion, given the opportunity, he lapses into a kind of insanity and seeks to gratify his repressed emotions in the murder of Aurelia.
Now anyone who knows all this about Cornelius will perhaps see that there is a curious tension here between his neurosis, in which he is a victim of his own life circumstances, the product of his up bringing, and between his own personal responsibility and choice, which he exercised many times - both in failing to address his base instincts, and also when he deliberately chose to gratify his deepest repressed desires.
Note this carefully: we do not hold Cornelius to be free from personal responsibility simply because of his upbringing and neurosis. He is very much at fault in the matter of Aurelia’s death.
But now, what is our response to Cornelius? Most people who knew and loved Aurelia, and many more besides will instinctively wish for the death of Cornelius. Deep down we all have a desire for retribution when wrong is done against us, or those we love. Such emotions are not a neurosis, but they are an emotional, not a rational response.
If we give in to those emotions and deliberately allow the torture or killing of Cornelius, then we have made exactly the same choice that Cornelius made. We have chosen to kill (or torture) simply to sate our base instincts.
We should not hold Cornelius responsible fo his neurosis - that is beyond his control, but we rightly hold him responsible for his choices, and thus his actions. But if we make the same choices as he did, then we really are no better than he is. If we were in his shoes, we must conclude we would have done what he did.
Thus when we punish Cornelius, we must hold to some higher ideal for the punishment than simply that it sates our inate desire for vengeance. Punishment may hold an element of retribution, but a restrained retribution that allows for some measure of healing.
Punishment should be a deterrant, but also with the hope that the offender may be rehabilitated too.
This is what I understand Blewyn to be saying when he says that killing the offender makes us as bad as he, and this is why we need a rather more rational debate on the whole concept of punishment than can be found following straight after various deradful tragedies.
Note that killing Cornelius will not bring Aurelia back, nor heal the hurt that her beloved Marcus feels deep inside.
Someone might say:
Actually it solves the danger of the perpetrator doing it again, and it solves the financial burden of keeping them in jail. And it sends the message that if you cross the line, you go down, permanently.
The message seems to be lost, if the U.S. is anything to go by. The issue of cost should not be a factor - what price our humanity? As for the danger of the perpetrator doing it again? Life sentences can achieve this.
Not the case. You might have a death penalty as a deterrent, for example. Whether or not effective, the motive wouldn’t be the same.
The deterrent needn’t apply to the murderer; it might deter other people choosing to murder. The measure of that would be difficult and there’s not much point citing unanalysed stats from the States - you don’t have an easy counterfactual.
Only if you’re a simplistic, reductionist, determinist and, even less likely, think that the small range of causes you’ve posited are the only ones that need be considered.
But I believe you’re a Christian, ain’t cha? And that I’ll be saved if I accept Cheeses Christ but not saved if I don’t? But you seem to be supporting a rather simple determinism now so why wouldn’t I be able to get to your lovely heaven?
And this is what passes for thought?
If we knew that the death penalty could be an effective deterrent, then this is true. However, even if you dismiss the evidence from the U.S.A., you are left with no data that plausibly disproves the null hypothesis that the death penalty has no deterrent effect. As we cannot discard the null hypothesis, we must examine our motives as to why we would argue for a death penalty when we cannot say it has a deterrent effect.
There is a difference between the argument that the death penalty is a deterrent and our actual motive.
The counterfactual is the assumption of deterrence. If capital punishment were a deterrent, we would be morally vindicated in choosing to execute criminals. Except this suffers the problems of all counterfactuals, and is probably not as simple as that.
The rest of your message was ad hominem, and did not attempt a refutation, so I’ll stop here.
Thanks for your comment.
Stephen
You claimed the motive would be the same. It needn’t be. You were wrong.
The rest wasn’t ad hominem. Look it up.
I claimed that if one gives in to a desire of unrestrained retribution then the motive is essentially equally reprehensible. I also specifically said:
“Punishment may hold an element of retribution, but a restrained retribution that allows for some measure of healing.
Punishment should be a deterrant, but also with the hope that the offender may be rehabilitated too.”
I did not say the motive would be the same. I did say that were we in his shoes, we must conclude we would have done the same thing he did, if we give in to our base instincts.
If I am wrong (and I accept that I could be, of course), you have not demonstrated the error here.
The rest of your comment was indeed ad hominem. Ad hominem, as I am sure you know, is Latin for “to the man”. Consider how your argument above is directed at the person with whom you are arguing rather than the substance of the argument.
Thanks for your interest.
Our choice would not be the same. We wouldn’t be ’simply’ satisfying base instincts: we could be deliberately employing the death penalty as a deterrent. Note I haven’t argued for or against, I’ve pointed out that you are wrong.
As the the ad hominem - my remarks were entirely appropriate because you say you are a Chistian, a religion that offers paradise for accepting a set of beliefs: that seems unfair if at the same time you’re such a determinist in other things. There’s a glaring contradiction between your argument here, such as it is, and your religious claims, and pointing out the contradiction is pertinent.
Inasmuch as capital punishment is a deterrent (over, say, whole of life sentences), this is true, as I have stated. However, as there is no evidence of a deterrent effect, the argument is counterfactual.
However, it is possible to make a narrower case, and I take it this is what you are trying to say: that there may be other reasons for choosing capital punishment than the satisfaction of our base instinct for retribution. I happen to think that all the other reasons given for executing people rather than whole of lofe tarrifs are also problematic, but not for reasons I have written above. For instance, it can be cheaper to execute a criminal than to house them in a prison for the rest of their life. I would discount that argument based on the observation that economics do not drive morality. Other arguments are also posited.
Therefore I propose that you read my thesis above as: inasmuch as our desire to execute criminals is found in a satisfaction of a basic instinct to exact retribution, it is immoral.
You go on to defend your use of an ad hominem line by protesting that it is unfair that a I should appear to have a contradiction in the belief set you impute to me by my faith and the belief set you impute to me in the argument above. This line is ad hominem, as I have said.
If you wish to explore whether one can be a Christian and hold to a viewpoint that is apparently deterministic, then you could take me up on my challenge to read some Christian literature. For instance, I think you will find my viewpoint above is in some senses a poor relation to the thesis of Jonathan Edwards in his essay “On the Freedom of the Will”, in which he takes issue with Hobbesian determinism amongst other things, but nevertheless produces a seminal work on what exactly is meant by the freedom of the will.
You will note that Edwards, as a puritan, does not exclude the miraculous from his philosophy - but for him, even the freedom brought by the intervention of the Holy Spirit is predestined.
This is not the article to discuss that viewpoint though. If you wish, I will re-read Edwards and try to summarise his viewpoint in a psot on this blog (or you could read his treatise and summarise on your blog, to which I could comment).
The problem with an ad hominem line though, is that if you follow it, you will spend more time complaining about the fairness of my position on these issues between which you see a tension, and less time considering the argument proposed.
Thanks again for your comments (which I appreciate, btw. I would much rather see a contrary opinion that probes the ideas, rather than a whole bunch of messages just agreeing - or worse, no comment at all.)
I don’t understand why you keep missing my point - that I’m not defending captital punishment but rather taking issue with the quality of your arguments.
So I’ll say it again. I’m not defending capital punishment.
If you really believe this then it can’t possibly square with your Christianity unless you’re some sort of Calvinist. Let’s put it like this:
I go through life rejecting your religion at every opportunity because I find it unconvincing, immoral and childish, and its adherents patronising, smug, annoying and hypocritical. However, to my amazement, it turns out you’re right and I’m wrong so when I die I don’t get eternal paradise. You do, though.
But you say, in the context of a murder, if we were in his shoes, we must conclude we would have done what he did.
So you get eternal paradise and I get eternal damnation despite your conviction that, given each other’s circumstances, we couldn’t have done otherwise.
Doesn’t make sense to me.
By the way. Taking issue with ridiculous opinions isn’t in itself an attack on an individual who hold those opinions - though that might be prefectly justified.
And I don\’t know why you keep missing mine, which I repeat: inasmuch as our desire to execute criminals is found in a satisfaction of a basic instinct to exact retribution, it is immoral.
So I can possibly believe this. There exist Christians (Calvinists) who would believe this. Your protestation that it is unfair that I hold a position that you see as determinism whilst holding to an apparently contardictory Christian faith turns out to be spurious, because there is at least one whole group of Christians who do indeed hold to a doctrine of theological determinism.
Note that “some sort of Calvinist” could have a very broad interpretation. For instance, to many people\’s point of view, Finney is “some sort of Calvinist”, so beware at this point of taking your ad hominem line further and imputing to me all the views you may believe to be held by Calvinists - that would only lead to unnecessary stereotyping. It is enough to now note that I could indeed hold to the viewpoint I have expressed above and to a Christian faith. This ad hominem line fails.
I feel the same way about entymologists.
Only your first reason for rejecting Christianity is valid. All the others suggest you are allowing emotion to dictate your belief set. I find many (perhaps most) atheists patronising, smug, annoying and hypocritical (oh, and yes - childish too in some key examples) - but should I reject atheism because of this?
But conviction? That is not in my gift.
I notice you misunderstand my argument when you quote me as saying:
I am saying that if and only if we give in to the base instinct of retribution, then we must conclude that were we in the same position as Cornelius, we would have done as he has done. (See, not so classically Calvinistic as all that, is it?) Because we make no attempt to choose to ignore our base instincts, we must conclude that were our instincts afflicted by the same neurosis as Cornelius, we would not have chosen to ignore those instincts either, and our action is equally reprehensible.
Right, last go.
Two points: firstly, satisfying a basic instinct isn’t necessarily immoral. Secondly, I haven’t argued that executing criminals must be based in satisfying such an instinct - if you recall that’s exactly what i took exception to.
So my cited reason, which was that Christianity is immoral, isn’t a valid reason to reject the religion? How so?
Yes, that’s why I mentioned Calvinism. And of course it’s utter nonsense. God preordains my damnation? Nice of him. And he wants me to worship him? Why would I do that then?
This is a critique of a faith position. Stop saying it’s ad hominem as if you’ve just discovered the Junior Guide to Logical Fallacies. You couldn’t believe in predestination and believe in Christian redemption, which i presume you do, and be making sense. There’s a logical contradiction.
I find Christians hypocritical and patronising because of their glossing over of the problem of evil - for example. What’s your reason for finding atheists hypocritical? Or was that just a playground nyaa-nyaa na na na rejoinder?
Except that is a straw man. My thesis is that the satisfaction of the base instinct to kill is immoral.
Now that is exactly my thesis, and if that is what you say is not immoral, it is up to you to demonstrate why my argument as to why it is immoral is incorrect.
And as you will recall, I have agreed from the start that inasmuch it is possible not to kill on the base instinct for retribution, this is possible. The question is only whether the other reasons themselves stack up.
Because a religion based on the message of tolerance of Christ is not immoral.
Or you could just desist with the ad hominem line…
Notice how you are spending more time attacking belief sets you (often wrongly) impute to me than the nub of the argument. Your line is fallacious.
No, these are personal observations. I will not go into them because it is unfair on those with no ability to reply. My point is that human nature is human nature, and that emotion is a very poor reason to reject or accept a belief.
Well put Stephen. Very well put. Thank you.
[...] Dredge through this blog and you will find my argument on capital punishment. In the comments for that article, you will see a commentator opened his criticism of my argument with this: But I believe you’re a Christian, ain’t cha? And that I’ll be saved if I accept Cheeses Christ but not saved if I don’t? [...]
[...] classic example of an ad hominem can be found in the comments on this blog. In my article on Capital Punishment, I wrote an article on a controversial subject taking a very specific line of argument. A [...]